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the prisoner’s dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the
cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the
cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range
of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always
likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of
the cooperative behavior.
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Introduction
The emergence of cooperation has puzzled philosophers and
researchers since a long time ago. For instance, already in the
seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes (1651) claimed that all
people are egoists, they are primarily concerned with their own
well-being, and act towards the defense of their own interests and
properties [1]. Thus, the requirement for the cooperation among
selfish individuals is the existence of a central authority.
Nevertheless, cooperative behavior is ubiquitous in nature. One
may find many examples in ecological and social sciences where
cooperation exists in a decentralized way. Perhaps the greatest step
to clarify this issue was given by Axelrod [2,3]. Axelrod has
surveyed the conditions under which the cooperative behavior
may emerge in groups wherever the presence of a central force is
lacking. His main finding was that the cooperation could emerge
spontaneously between individuals who seek their own interests
provided that a principle of reciprocity prevails among them.
The main legacy of Axelrod was to formalize the conflict and
cooperation among selfish individuals in terms of the game theory
approach, that has been demonstrated to be very appropriate to
address this class of problem [4,5]. The prisoner’s dilemma Game
(PDG) fits well in this category [6]. The PDG is a two-players
game where at every encounter each player has to decide either to
cooperate (C) or to defect (D). Whether one supposes that the
individual aims to maximize his own gain rather than contributing
to the collective benefit, then it is expected that in the prisoner’s
dilemma game betraying is the rational choice. Notwithstanding,
this behavior does not hold when the game is iterated many times.
Axelrod showed that in the game with repetition, in which the
individuals are randomly matched, the cooperative behavior may
coexist with the selfish behavior, a situation that remains stable
throughout the evolution.
Later on, it was shown that the interplay between interaction
rules and spatial structure can be an effective mean to promote
cooperation [7]. The mechanism underneath the enhancement of
the cooperation in spatially structured population is the cluster
formation. The aggregation of cooperators enables them to get
protected against the invasion of free riders [8]. This intriguing
result has motivated many other investigations to depict the role of
network topologies on the patterns of the cooperation among
individuals. Within the framework of game theory, several
topologies such as regular lattices [9,10], regular random [11],
random graphs [12–16] and complex networks [17–20] have been
extensively studied and discussed in the literature [6]. These
networks display a varying degree on the level of heterogeneity of
connectivities, which increases as one changes from regular to
complex networks. The heterogeneity of the interaction networks
has been established as an important feature aiding the evolution
of cooperation [15,21–23], because cooperators profit from the
occupation of densely connected nodes which by its turn help their
dissemination. The identification of other mechanisms that lead to
cooperation persistence on evolutionary PDG has been reported in
the literature. Nowak highlighted the kin selection, directed
reciprocity, indirected reciprocity, network reciprocity and group
selection as the key rules [24].
Recently much attention has been paid to the role of mobility in
different versions of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. It is now
recognized that migration can also be a very important
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Vainstein et al. studied the role of migration in systems with a
fixed density of cooperators which are randomly placed in a two-
dimensional square lattice [25]. According to their model, the
agents look around in the nearest neighborhood to reproduce and
migrate. They are allowed to copy the strategy of the individual
with the highest payoff among their nearest neighbors (reproduc-
tion), and they are also allowed to move into an empty site with
probability m (migration). The reverse order of these actions
produces distinct results. Their model exhibits interesting
outcomes. In the former rule, where the copying process is
followed by the migration step, it is observed the existence of a
threshold for the migration probability m, where beyond that
point cooperators and defectors coexist. Below the threshold the
cooperative behavior reaches extinction. When the sequence of
these processes is reversed the meaning of the migration threshold
alters. Now, migration values larger than the threshold implies the
elimination of the cooperators. Vainstein et al. also verified that
the density of individuals affects the fate of the cooperation. They
ascertained that at low density the mobility has a detrimental effect
and thereby destroys cooperation, whereas at high density the
opposite happens and the mobility enhances cooperation. In order
to prevent the exploitation by defectors, the cooperators should be
disposed in compact clusters.
Following the ideas of Vainstein et al. [25] several other models
highlighting the role of migration have been proposed [26–32].
From these investigations important new concepts have arisen
such as the success-driven migration [26,27], adaptive migration
[28] and aspiration-induced migration [30,31].
The current work inquires the role of migration in the onset and
fixation of the cooperative behavior in subdivided populations.
The study of the interplay between evolutionary mechanisms and
the underlying topology where populations reside is an issue of
great interest since a long time ago. The first steps in this direction
was given by Kimura to study the problem of local differentiation
on genes frequencies in a structured population model [33]. The
model, known as the stepping-stone model, considers the
population to be subdivided into colonies where in each
generation individuals can migrate to nearby colonies. In standard
representations, these subpopulations are arranged on a two-
dimensional grid, such that the number of neighbors of each
subpopulation is the same when periodic boundary conditions are
assumed. Nowadays, it is well established that population structure
plays a prominent role in adaptive evolution [34,35], epidemiology
[36,37] and ecology [38], to cite just a few.
Likewise, our model assumes that the population comprises
several smaller subpopulations (demes) which are randomly
connected. These connections represent possible pathways where
the individuals can move between neighbor demes. We study the
prisoner’s dilemma game in an evolutionary perspective. The
evolutionary dynamics combines the game itself, adaptation and
migration. As expected, migration plays an important role in
driving the fate of the cooperative behavior. All the possible
outcomes, namely, extinction of the population, dominance of the
cooperative behavior and coexistence between cooperators and
defectors, are found. The extent of these distinct regimes is greatly
influenced by the migration rate and the level of structuring of the
population (number of demes). In particular, it is found that an
increased number of demes as well as an increased migration rate
favor the fixation of the cooperation. However, in the regime of
extremely large migration rates, where the coexistence between
cooperators and defectors is assured, the level of cooperation
diminishes as the exchange of migrants between the demes
becomes more intense. Another important feature is the observa-
tion, in the range of low migration rates, of a critical level of
structuring such that beyond that value cooperation can emerge.
In the next Section we describe the model. In the following we
present the simulation results and discussions. At the end of the
manuscript we present our conclusions.
Methods
The model
The population consists of N players which are distributed over
D demes (subpopulations), such that initially each deme has
initially Nd~N=D individuals. Each individual can adopt one of
the two pure strategies: cooperate (C) or defect (D) (See Figure 1).
The individuals interact and compete locally. The subpopulations
interact through the exchange of migrants.
The population evolves on time according to the following life
cycle: prisoner’s dilemma game, migration and selection. During
the prisoner’s dilemma stage, in each deme one randomly
constitutes Nd=2 pairs of individuals which are then forced to
play one round of the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG). At each
round, individuals are rewarded according to their strategy and
the strategy of their opponents. Following the original PDG,
whenever a cooperator matches a defector, the defector receives
the highest payoff T (temptation) while the cooperation is
punished with the lowest payoff S (sucker). Whenever a cooperator
matches another cooperator, both players get payoff R, whereas
the encounter of two defectors means that both are compensated
with payoff P. The payoffs satisfy the following condition
TwRwPwS. The additional requirement 2RwTzS is needed
in order to provide a non-null chance of the cooperative strategy to
persist.
As already mentioned, the demes interact through migration.
Every generation, each individual has a probability m of migrating
to one of the demes which is in its immediate neighborhood. After
migration the size of each deme is not necessarily equal to Nd.
Subsequently selection works. Selection is local, i.e., it occurs
isolatedly in each deme and consists in two steps. Firstly, those
individuals whose fitnesses are below the elimination threshold,
hereafter denoted by H, are automatically extinct. The elimina-
tion mechanism proposed by Zhang et al. [23] has been
demonstrated to be an important feature in fostering the
cooperation levels on evolving networks. The fitness depends on
the individual’s payoff and also on the fitness value in the previous
generation according to [23].
Ft~
1
2
Ft{1z
1
2
Pt, ð1Þ
where Fi denotes the individual’s fitness in generation t, while Pt is
the individual’s reward at the game stage (payoff). The use of the
generation-accumulated payoff as given by Eq. (1) embeds a
mechanism of learning, which is strongly supported by studies in
animal behavior [39,40] and economics [41]. Note that in the way
it is estimated, the fitness is bounded, and its maximum value is 2b.
After the elimination step, three configurations are possible:
1. The simplest one corresponds to the situation where the size of
the deme is exactly equal to Nd. In this case nothing else
happens.
2. The size of the deme is greater than Nd, what is possible due to
migration. In this case, an additional elimination process takes
place until the group size is restored to its carrying capacity Nd.
To proceed, the individuals are sorted according to their
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repeated until the carrying capacity is achieved.
3. The size of the deme is smaller than Nd. In this situation the
population experiences a local expansion and again the deme
size is restored to Nd. To proceed with the expansion
individuals replicate with probability proportional to their
fitness, i.e, the most adapted individuals have a greater chance
of producing offsprings. In the replication, the daughter
inherits the strategy of its parent, but not the fitness.
Figure 1 illustrates an instance of a structured population with
D~9 demes. In the example, the carrying capacity of each deme
is Nd~5. Cooperators and defectors coexist and one of the demes
is empty. The deme can only be recolonized through migration of
players from its neighborhood. It is important to stress that after
migration the deme size is not necessarily equal to Nd, as already
explained. When an individual migrates its fitness is not altered.
This assumption is not restrictive. We have checked that whether
one assumes that the evolutionary history of migrants is erased the
results do not alter qualitatively.
As the topology for the migratory network we consider the
random graph by Erdo ¨s and Re ´nyi [42]. Accordingly, each pair of
nodes of the graph is connected with probability p and thereby the
total number of links is pD(D{1)=2. Thus, the mean connectivity
of the graph (mean coordination number) is simply given by
z~p(D{1)^pD. In the limit of large D, the distribution of
connectivities follows a Poisson distribution like
P(k)~
e{zzk
k!
ð2Þ
which is entirely described by the single parameter z.
Results
During simulations we easily assess the concentrations of
cooperators and defectors over time. Henceforth, the simulation
data corresponds to the measurements carried out in the stationary
regime, which by definition is characterized either by a fixed value
of a given observable or when its value over time does not change
within a given accuracy. The states xc~0 and xc~1, where xc
denotes the frequency of cooperators, are absorbing states, once
cooperators or defectors are eliminated the evolutionary rule does
not restore them. The key ingredient of the current model is
structuring. Migration plays a crucial role because it can handle
the degree of isolation of the groups. When the migration rate m
goes to zero, the patches behave independently, whereas when
m?? migration has a high homogenizing effect and the
population behavior approaches that of a panmitic population
(homogeneous population).
In Figure 2(a) we show the likelihood of fixation of the
cooperative behavior. The fixation of the cooperation strategy
occurs either when it becomes the dominant strategy, i.e. xc~1,o r
when cooperators coexist with defectors in the population. To
differentiate these situations Figure 2(b) displays the probability of
coexistence between cooperators and defectors. For small enough
migration rates, such that the level of isolation of the patches is
high, the cooperative behavior is not sustainable even with the
existence of the elimination mechanism which is expected to
promote cooperation [23]. Under this situation, the population
evolves to an all-defect state and posteriorly reaches extinction
because a pure population of defectors can not persist (This
situation is slightly distinct when the level of subdivision is pretty
high (very large D), where there is a tiny chance of cooperation to
persist, as we will see in the phase-diagrams). Around
m~1|10{6 cooperators can thrive and the cooperative behavior
can fixate in the population. At this point, one observes a non-
coexistence regime and thereby either defectors or cooperators
dominate the population. The probability of persistence of the
cooperative behavior then rises with an increased migration rate
up to finding ensured fixation around m~5|10{4.I ti s
interesting to note that at this point the probability of coexistence
becomes non-null and then starts to rise with migration.
Coexistence is ensured at migration rate around m~2|10{3.
According to the above scenario, without migration the
dynamics leads the populations to extinction. As migration rate
rises, the deme that had become empty due to the dominance of
defectors can be recolonized by cooperators. These few newcomer
cooperators then experience an immediate expansion and can
achieve dominance. If the migration rate is further increased then
the individuals are migrating continuously, and because the time
scale of the movement throughout the population is short,
defectors are constantly exploiting cooperators in favorable
Figure 1. Description of the model. Left panel: The payoff matrix which describes the payoff value after one round of the prisoner’s dilemma
game between two players (blue and orange) according to their strategies. Middle panel: An illustration of the structured population model. In this
instance the population comprises D~9 demes each one with carrying capacity Nd~5. At this moment one of the demes is empty but
recolonization is possible through migration from the two neighbor demes. Just to point out, after migration the number of individuals can exceed or
be under the carrying capacity Nd. Right panel: The links represent possible paths where migrants can go through.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039188.g001
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defectors thrive and expand in a given deme, some of these
cheaters can move to a new group before extinction of the entire
deme. At the same time cooperators are more likely to migrate
into the deme, and complete extinction of the local population is
improbable. This is the regime where coexistence takes place.
Figure 3 exhibits the mean concentration of cooperators
conditioned on the fixation of the cooperative behavior. Observe
that for low migration values where the maintenance of the
cooperation is not very likely, the concentration of cooperators in
the steady regime, conditioned on its persistence, is exactly equal
to unity. This means that in this range of migration values
cooperators can not coexist with defectors. As the migration rate
rises the scenario remains the same up to migration rates of order
m~5|10{4 where coexistence becomes probable. Beyond this
value the level of cooperation declines with m. Though, the
cooperation level is significantly larger than zero even for
extremely high values of migration rates. In this phase, the
mobility of the players is intense, and as pointed out before,
coexistence between cooperators and defectors is ensured. The
extinction of demes is also an unlikely event and now defectors can
easily move to more favorable environments and increase their
fitness values without compromising the survival of the coopera-
tors that bear their existence. The higher the migration rate, the
higher the concentration of defectors. In resume, a greater
mobility requires a smaller frequency of cooperators to support
the coexistence regime.
Effect of population size and number of demes
In the upper left panel of Figure 4 we examine the probability of
fixation of the cooperative behavior and probability of coexistence
between cooperators and defectors versus migration rate for
different population sizes. When the number of demes is kept fixed
and the population size is augmented, the carrying capacity Nd of
the demes increases in the same way. Though, the population size
has no major effect on the probability of fixation of the cooperative
behavior, and the onset of the coexistence regime is slightly shifted
to lower values of migration rates as N enlarges (upper right of
Figure 4). A stronger effect of the population size is only seen in the
frequency of cooperators. In the coexistence regime, the cooper-
ation level clearly reduces with N.
In the lower panels we now address how the number of demes
affects the results of the model. Now the population size is held
constant, N~50,000, and two different values of the number of
demes are simulated, D~200 and D~1000. Major effects are
observed, which proves that structure plays a crucial role in the
fate of the cooperation. For larger D, the onset of the cooperative
regime shifts considerably towards a smaller migration rate.
Instead, the opposite happens to the onset of the coexistence
regime, which is then displaced to a larger migration rate.
Additionally, the transition becomes sharper. These drifts in
opposite ways now create a broad interval of migration values
where the cooperative behavior is the only attractor of the
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Figure 2. Evolution of the cooperative behavior with migration. Panel(a) Persistence of the cooperative behavior. The likelihood of fixation of
cooperators as a function of the migration rate m. (b) Probability of coexistence between cooperators and defectors versus migration rate m. The
parameter values are maximum population size N~20000, number of subpopulations D~200, elimination threshold H~0:4 and payoff matrix
elements T~b~1:2, R~1, P~S~0. The data points are averages over 200 independent runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039188.g002
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of the cooperative behavior is constrained to a narrow region. One
can readily infer from the lower left panel that for one decade of
the migration rate (1|10{4vmv1|10{3) the cooperative
behavior is the only possible outcome of the evolutionary process.
Further, one can remark that the cooperation level in the
coexistence regime is also affected, being considerably larger for
a more subdivided population, as seen in the lower right panel.
The qualitative results of the model are very robust and poorly
sensitive to the topology of the migration networks. To corrob-
orate this ascertainment, Figure 5 left shows the probabilities of
fixation of the cooperative behavior and coexistence for different
topologies of the migratory network, namely, random graphs,
island model, and scale-free networks. In scale-free networks the
distribution of connectivities follows a power-law like P(k)!k{c
[43,44]. In the island model, introduced by Wright [45], a single
migration event is equally likely to move the individual to any
other deme in the population, i.e., the connectivity of every deme
is constant and equal to D{1. When looking at the probabilities
of cooperation and coexistence, the results are nearly indistin-
guishable. Though, a consistent pattern of differentiation among
the topologies arises when one analyzes the concentration of
cooperators (Figure 5 right). In the regime of coexistence between
cooperators and defectors, which corresponds to large values of
migration rates, the larger the heterogeneity of the network,
characterized by the variance of the connectivity distribution, the
higher the sustained level of cooperation. In one extreme the
island model has a null variance for the connectivity distribution
and displays the smallest concentration of cooperators in the
coexistence regime. On the other side, the scale-free networks has
a diverging variance and sustain the highest levels of cooperation.
The random graphs has a finite variance and fall in between these
two extremes. The same happens to their sustained levels of
cooperation. For the sake of completeness, in Figure 6 we study the
role of the elimination threshold H on the dynamics of the system.
Once more, the results remain qualitatively unchanged. The most
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coexistence regimes towards higher values of migration.
Phase diagram
To summarize the previous results Figures 7 and 8 sketch
typical phase diagrams in the parameter space
numberofdemes(D)|migrationrate(m). The lines delimit the four
distinct regimes: (1) extinction, which occurs when defectors
overcome cooperators and are subsequently extinct; (2) coopera-
tion is likely, which denotes the region of the parameter space
where the populations evolve either to a pure cooperative state
with a non-null probability (but not equal to one) or goes to
extinction; (3) the pure cooperation regime means that the only
possible outcome is the dominance of the population by
cooperators; and finally (4) coexistence phase, which denotes the
region of stability where both cooperators and defectors can
coexist. The outline of the phase diagrams is strongly influenced by
the population size. In this way the population size is kept fixed,
N~5,000 in both plots. One striking feature on the phase
diagrams is the existence of a critical number of demes, denoted by
Dc. Above the threshold Dc the likelihood that the system evolves
to the cooperative behavior becomes non-negligible even when
m?0. For the set of parameters of the Figure 7 Dc~125, while in
Figure 8 where the temptation payoff is larger (T~b~1:8) the
threshold augments to Dc~140. To delineate the lines we adopted
as a criterion that the onset of cooperation corresponds to a
probability of fixation which exceeds 1%. For a population of size
N~50,000, and assuming T~b~1:2, the critical level of
structuring is almost ten-fold larger Dc^1100 (data not shown).
This result corroborates that finiteness can be very effective in
shaping the evolution of the cooperative behavior. Because the fate
in each deme is not deterministic, there is always a non-negligible
likelihood that cooperation can fixate by chance in a given deme,
which is larger as the strength of stochasticity becomes more
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D~200, T~b~1:2, R~1, P~S~0. Black symbols correspond to elimination threshold H~0:1, while red symbols denote H~0:4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039188.g006
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too low, once cooperation fixates in a single or in a few demes, the
remaining demes which are dominated by defectors will reach
extinction. These empty demes can subsequently be recolonized
by the successful cooperators. Of course, because m?0, it will take
a long time for the complete spreading of the cooperative
behavior. A similar mechanism, known as multilevel selection,
can promote cooperation on populations evolving on random
networks [15,16]. In that case, evolving random interaction
networks can have an optimal response for the evolution of
cooperation when the process of addition/deletions of links turns
possible the formation of isolated homogeneous groups, which by
its turn enhances the strength of the cooperators in the population
[15,16]. Actually, the term multilevel selection within the
framework of the evolution of cooperation was first coined by
Traulsen and Nowak [46]. Once more, it refers to the mechanism
that promotes group selection where cooperators benefit from
homogeneous groups while defectors do not.
As the migration rate is increased the extinction regime
disappears and the regime where cooperation is likely becomes no
more constrained to populations with number of demes larger
than Dc. Sweeping the whole range of migration rates from low to
large values one first observes that the system is propelled into a
pure cooperative regime, where the dominance of the cooperative
behavior is deterministic. The width of the pure cooperative
regime grows with D. At this point, it is very important to point
out the role of the temptation payoff (T). When the temptation
payoff is high, it is possible for the system to change from the
cooperation is likely phase to the coexistence phase without passing
through the intermediate pure cooperation regime for small enough D
(see Figure 8).
For sufficiently large values of m, it is always possible to obtain
the coexistence between the two strategies. A striking feature is
that the coexistence regime signifies a double-edged sword for the
evolution of cooperation: at the same time it warrants the fixation
of the cooperative strategy, it also implies that a higher migration
rate means that lower levels of cooperation are sustained.
Discussion
This paper has investigated the conditions under which the
cooperation is maintained in structured populations. The popu-
lation comprises individuals that adopt pure strategies and have to
decide to cooperate or to defect on every round of the prisoner’s
dilemma game. The problem is addressed in an evolutionary
perspective, such that individuals which are most successful have a
better chance of avoiding elimination and can contribute with
more offspring. The main goal of the current work is to determine
the importance of structuring in the evolutionary outcome and the
required conditions for the sustaining of the cooperative behavior.
The level of structuring is established by the number of
subpopulations and the migration rate. When the number of
demes is enlarged the population size within the demes becomes
smaller, which increases the effects related to finiteness because
reproduction is performed stochastically. The most strong
evidence of the role of this stochastic force is the existence of a
threshold for the number of demes beyond which there is a non-
negligible chance of obtaining the fixation and dominance of the
cooperative strategy even for extremely low values of migration.
The importance of finiteness in the evolution of cooperation has
already been demonstrated in the success rate of invasion of a
single individual using the tit-for-tat strategy in a population of All-
defect individuals [47].
Several recent investigations have addressed the role of mobility
(migration) in spatially extended evolutionary games [25–
27,29,48,49]. Some of these works report the action of mobility
in shaping spatiotemporal patterns that favor the robustness and
maintenance of cooperation [26,27,48,49]. Our simulation results
demonstrate a paradoxical role of the migration mechanism in
promoting cooperation in subdivided populations with no
underlying spatial structure. At first glance, in the range at which
migration rate is pretty small a gradual increasing of the migration
rate has a beneficial effect in promoting the evolution of the
cooperation. Low migration rates mean high level of isolation and
thereby each subpopulation behaves as an independent popula-
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Figure 7. Phase diagram in the parameter space numberofdemes(D)|migrationrate(m). The parameter values are N~5,000, H~0:5,
T~b~1:2, R~1, P~S~0. The red dashed-line denotes the critical value for the number of demes, Dc, such that for any DwDC the chance of
obtaining the cooperative behavior is greater than or equal to 1%.
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cooperators and the population is subsequently extinct. Though,
above a certain level of structuring Dc, where stochastic events are
even stronger, the elimination of cooperators by defectors is not
mandatory and now cooperation is also likely to persist. As
migration rate increases the extinction phase disappears, and now
the system can evolve either to a cooperative or to a defective state
no matter the number of demes. The existence of a pure
cooperative behavior is also possible and verified for intermediate
values of migration rates. Again, the level of structuring plays a
prominent role in enhancing cooperation by increasing the width
of the pure cooperative phase as D increases.
The detrimental effect of migration comes about in the range of
large migration rates. Though elevated migration rates warrants
the fixation of the cooperative strategy, it also enables the survival
of defectors. Defectors survive by continuously exploring favorable
subpopulations, which by turn are less prone to extinction because
the high mobility of cooperators also enables them to more rapidly
explore the demes which are facing degradation due to the growth
of the local defector population. As m further increases a lower
level of cooperation is needed in order to keep the coexistence
between cooperators and defectors. In resume, higher levels of
cooperation are obtained at intermediate values of migration rates.
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